UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

WILLIAM SCALES,

Plaintiff,

-against-

TD BANK,

Defendant.

24-CV-3753 (LTS)

ORDER

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff filed this action *pro se*. On July 18, 2024, the Court dismissed the complaint because Plaintiff did not pay the fees to bring a new civil action or ask that the fees be waived. On August 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed a letter asking that the action be "reinstated." (ECF 6, at 1.) He claims that "[t]his case has had a Court fee waiver" and asks for reinstatement of the case because he "currently [is] seeking legal counsel." (*Id.*)

The Court liberally construes this submission as a motion for relief from a judgment or order under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. *See Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons*, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006); *see also Tracy v. Freshwater*, 623 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 2010) (The solicitude afforded to *pro se* litigants takes a variety of forms, including liberal construction of papers, "relaxation of the limitations on the amendment of pleadings," leniency in the enforcement of other procedural rules, and "deliberate, continuing efforts to ensure that a pro se litigant understands what is required of him") (citations omitted). After reviewing the arguments in Plaintiff's submission, the Court denies the motion.¹

¹ On August 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, and on the same day, the Clerk's Office electronically transferred this action to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The transfer of a case ordinarily divests the transferor court of jurisdiction over the action. *Drabik v. Murphy*, 246 F.2d 408, 409 (2d Cir. 1957) (holding that district court did not have jurisdiction to rule on motion following physical transfer of case). The transferor court

DISCUSSION

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), a party may seek relief from a district court's order or judgment for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason justifying relief.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). A motion based on reasons (1), (2), or (3) must be filed "no more than one year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).

The Court has considered Plaintiff's arguments, and even under a liberal interpretation of his motion, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that any of the grounds listed in the first five clauses of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) apply. To the extent Plaintiff argues that the Court acted in error when dismissing this action, because Plaintiff had in fact submitted a request to waive the fees, the Court denies the motion because the Clerk's Office never received Plaintiff's request for waiver.

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), the motion is also denied. "[A] Rule 60(b)(6) motion must be based upon some reason other than those stated in clauses (1)-(5)." *United Airlines, Inc. v. Brien*, 588 F.3d 158, 175 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting *Smith v.*

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retains jurisdiction over the action only if the party seeking review acts to stay the transfer "prior to receipt of the action's papers by the clerk of the transferee court." *Warrick v. Gen. Electric Co.*, 40 F.3d 736, 739 (2d Cir. 1995). Plaintiff filed his letter before the Clerk of Court electronically transmitted this action to the Court of Appeals. The Court therefore retains jurisdiction to rule on the motion.

Sec'y of HHS, 776 F.2d 1330, 1333 (6th Cir. 1985)). A Rule 60(b)(6) motion must show that

"extraordinary circumstances' [exist] to warrant relief." Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Pac. Fin. Servs.

of America, Inc., 301 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant relief

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). See Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199-202 (1950).

Plaintiff's seeking counsel does not amount to extraordinary circumstances. The Court therefore

denies the motion on this ground as well.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff's letter (ECF 6), construed as Rule 60(b) motion for reconsideration, is denied.

The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate all motions in this action.

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would

not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an

appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

Dated:

August 20, 2024

New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN

Chief United States District Judge

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